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Cryptanalysis of the reduced-round RC6

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Abstract. We investigate the cryptanalysis of the reduced-round RC6 without whitening. Up to the present, previous key recovery algorithm against the reduced-round RC6 itself, the reduced-round RC6 without whitening, and even the simplified variants are infeasible on a modern computer. In this paper, we propose the efficient and feasible key recovery algorithm against the reduced-round RC6 without whitening. Our algorithm is very useful to analyze the security of the round-function of RC6. Our attack applies to a rather large number of rounds. RC6 without whitening with r rounds can be broken in a success probability of 90% by using $2^{8.1r-13.8}$ plaintexts. Therefore, our attack can break RC6 without whitening with 17 rounds by using $2^{123.9}$ plaintexts in a probability of 90%.

keywords: RC6, a known plaintext attack, a correlation attack

1 Introduction

RC6[13] is a block cipher, which is constructed by only simple arithmetic such as a multiplication, an addition, a bit-wise exclusive-or(XOR), and a data dependent rotation. Therefore, RC6 can be implemented efficiently in software with small amount of memory. RC6 is submitted as a candidate for NESSIE[12], and recently has been selected to proceed the next stage. RC6-32/ r /16 means that four 32-bit-word plaintexts are encrypted by r rounds with 16 byte keys. RC6 is the next version of RC5[14], which consists of only an addition, a bit-wise exclusive-or(XOR), and a data dependent rotation. RC5 also includes a data dependent rotation, which is much efficiently improved in RC6 in such a way that it is determined by all 32 bits of both data and subkey but not 5 bits. Such an efficient improvement makes RC6 much secure because it is difficult to handle the rotation by choosing specific plaintexts. Compared with various attacks against RC5[1, 2, 5, 7, 4, 11], any key recovery algorithm against RC6 [3, 2, 8] requires much memory and work even in the case of low round. Multiple linear cryptanalysis is applied to RC6 with 32-byte keys[16], but it has not been applied to RC6 with 16-byte keys.

Correlation attack makes use of correlations between an input and an output, which is measured by the χ^2 test: the specific rotation in RC6 is considered

to cause the correlations between the corresponding two 10-bit integer values. Correlation attack consists of two parts, the distinguishing algorithm and the key recovery algorithm. The distinguishing algorithm has only to handle plaintexts in such a way that the χ^2 -value of a part of the ciphertext becomes a significantly higher value. On the other hand, the key recovery algorithm has to rule out all false keys, and single out exactly a correct key by using the χ^2 -value. However, only distinguishing algorithm has been investigated, up to the present [8, 4]. That is, only the high χ^2 -value is focused, which is experimentally computed on the average of keys.

In [8], correlation attacks are applied to recover subkeys from the 1st subkey to the final subkey by handling a plaintext (A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0) in such a way that the χ^2 -value after one round becomes significantly higher value. However, unfortunately, their key recovery algorithm has not been executed yet although their distinguishing algorithm has been implemented. Because their algorithm is forced to recover all 32 bits of the first subkey, and thus it requires $2^{62.2}$ works with 2^{42} memory even in the case of RC6 with 5 rounds. In a realistic sense, it would be infeasible to employ such an algorithm on a modern computer. This is why their key recovery algorithm is estimated by only using the results of distinguishing algorithm. Their key recovery algorithm is roughly summarized as follows: 1. Choose a plaintext in such a way that the least significant five bits of A_0 and C_0 , $lsb_5(A_0)$ and $lsb_5(C_0)$, are fixed; 2. For a plaintext and the corresponding 2^{27} first subkeys that leads the zero rotation in the first round, compute the χ^2 -value of concatenation of $lsb_5(A_{r+1})$ and $lsb_5(C_{r+1})$ of an output after r rounds, $(A_{r+1}, B_{r+1}, C_{r+1}, D_{r+1})$; 3. Output a subkey with the highest χ^2 -value as the first subkey. Their key recovery algorithm is based on the next idea: the χ^2 -value is significantly high if a plaintext is suitably fixed so that one (or both) of the data dependent rotation in the first round is zero. It exactly works well as a distinguishing algorithm, but, as a key recovery algorithm, it is unlikely that it rules out all false keys well in the following reason: the data dependent rotation depends on all bits of 32-bit subkey, however, the information amount on data dependent rotation is only 5 bits. Fixing the first round rotation to zero is just fixing the 5-bit information amount on the first subkey but not all its 32bits. In fact, for a plaintext, there are 2^{27} first subkeys that lead to the zero rotation. This is why the above algorithm is unlikely to rule out all false keys. We also note that the number of available plaintexts for each key in their attack is reduced to 2^{118} .

In [11], a correlation attack against RC5 is proposed by using the same idea of fixing the first round rotation as [8]. They report three interesting and new results: 1. their algorithm can search every four bits of subkey in the final round; 2. their algorithm can recover subkeys with the high probability with a rather low χ^2 -value; 3. an algorithm, applying [8] to RC5, cannot recover subkeys with the high probability although the χ^2 -value is extremely high. Their results indicate that not all bits but a few bits of subkeys can be recovered under the condition of fixing the first round rotation, and that a good distinguishing algorithm does not necessarily work as a good key recovery algorithm.

RC6 consists of three parts, pre-whitening, r -round iterations of round function, and post-whitening. In this paper, we focus on the round function of RC6, RC6 without whitening. Here we simply call RC6 without whitening to RC6W. We propose the feasible key recovery algorithm for the reduced-round RC6W for the first time. We improve the distinguishing algorithm in such a way that the χ^2 -values for outputs become significantly high with less constrain of plaintexts, and then improve key recovery algorithm in such a way that the variance of χ^2 -value is reduced. We know that an output of RC6 is highly unlikely to be uniformly distributed if B_0 or D_0 of a plaintext (A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0) introduces zero rotation in the 1st round, and $lsb_5(A_0)$ and $lsb_5(C_0)$ is fixed[8]. More generally, we investigate how an output after r rounds, both A_{r+1} and C_{r+1} , depends on a chosen plaintext, and find experimentally the following feature of RC6: the χ^2 -values for the concatenation of $lsb_5(A_{r+1})$ and $lsb_5(C_{r+1})$ of an output after r rounds become significantly high if both the least significant 5 bits of the first and third words before addition to each 1st-round subkey are just fixed. This means that we can use any plaintext by classifying them into groups with the same condition, and thus, the number of available plaintext is 2^{128} , which is very useful for distinguishing RC6 without pre-whitening.

We improve the key recovery algorithm by taking full advantage of the above feature, that is, the χ^2 -values become significantly high for any group. As mentioned above, only the high average of χ^2 -value has been discussed. However, we also direct our attention to the variance of χ^2 -value. We compute the χ^2 -value not flatly for all plaintext but for plaintexts in each group, and then compute the average among these χ^2 -value. As a result, the variance of χ^2 -value is reduced, and the key recovery algorithm is expected to rule out all false keys. The main points of our feasible key recovery algorithm are as follows:

1. Use any plaintext by classifying it into groups;
2. Compute the χ^2 -value of an output for plaintexts in each group, and then compute the average among these χ^2 -value.

We also present three key recovery algorithms, which reflect the effect of computing the χ^2 -value on each classified group. By employing our attack, RC6W with 5 rounds can be broken within 20 minutes on PPC 604e/332MHz by using 2^{27} plaintexts and 2^{26} memory. RC6W with r rounds can be broken with a success probability of 90% by using $2^{8.1r-13.8}$ plaintexts. As a result, our attack can break RC6W with 17 rounds by using $2^{123.9}$ plaintexts in a probability of 90%. Our algorithm can work faster than an exhaustive key search for the 128-bit key with feasible size of memory, 2^{26} . In [13], a two register version for RC6 is also described, called RC6-64 in this paper. RC6-64 is oriented to 64-bit architecture, and plaintexts consists of two 64-bit words. The size of subkeys in RC6-64 is 64 bits. So the security level of one round in RC6-64, the size of subkeys, is estimated to be equal to that in RC6-32, which has two 32-bit subkeys in one round. Furthermore the round function of RC6-64 is almost the same structure as that of RC6. So it is very useful to discuss the difference of each security of round function. By applying our attack to RC6-64 without whitening with r rounds, it can be broken in a success probability of 90% by using $2^{5.0r-8.2}$ plaintexts. As a

result, our attack can break RC6-64 without whitening with 27 rounds by using $2^{126.8}$ plaintexts in a probability of 90%. The weakpoint of RC5 is thought to a data dependent rotation, which is defined by only 5-bit subkey and data, but not the data structure of two words. Although the weakness of data dependent rotation is improved in both RC6 and RC6-64, RC6-64 is much weaker than RC6. From our results, we see that the data structure of RC6, 4-word plaintexts, also makes the security high.

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some notations and definitions in this paper. Section 3 describes some experimental results including the above features of RC6. Section 4 presents the chosen plaintext algorithm, Algorithm 2 and 3. Section 5 discusses how to extend the chosen plaintext algorithm to the known plaintext algorithm, Algorithm 4. Section 6 applies Algorithm 4 for a two-register version for RC6, and discusses the difference between the original RC6 and a two-register version for RC6 from a security point of view.

2 Preliminary

This section denotes some notations, definitions, and experimental remarks. In this paper, RC6-32, AES submission version, is simply denoted to RC6. First we describe RC6 algorithm after defining the following notations.

- $+$, \boxminus ($-$, \boxplus): an addition (subtraction) mod 2^{32} ; \oplus : a bit-wise exclusive OR;
- r : the number of (full)rounds;
- $a \lll b$ ($a \ggg b$): a cyclic rotation of a to the left(right) by b bits;
- (L_i, R_i) : an input of the i -th half-round, (L_0, R_0) is a plaintext, (L_{h+1}, R_{h+1}) is a ciphertext after h half-rounds encryption;
- S_i : the i -th subkey (S_{h+1} is a subkey of the h -th half-round);
- $lsb_n(X)$: the least significant n bits of X ;
- X^i : denotes the i -th bit of X ;
- $X^{[i,j]}$: denotes from the i -th bit to the j -th bit of X ($i > j$);
- \overline{X} : a bit-wise inversion of X ;
- $f(X) : X \times (2X + 1)$; $F(X) : f(X) \pmod{2^{32}} \lll 5$.

We denote the least significant bit(LSB) to the 1st bit, and the most significant bit(MSB) as the 32-th bit for any 32-bit element. RC6 encryption is defined as follows:

Algorithm 1 (Encryption with RC6)

1. $A_1 = A_0$; $B_1 = B_0 + S_0$; $C_1 = C_0$; $D_1 = D_0 + S_1$;
2. **for** $i = 1$ **to** r **do**: $t = F(B_i)$; $u = F(D_i)$; $A_{i+1} = B_i$;
 $B_{i+1} = ((C_i \oplus u) \lll t) + S_{2i+1}$; $C_{i+1} = D_i$; $D_{i+1} = ((A_i \oplus t) \lll u) + S_{2i}$;
3. $A_{r+2} = A_{r+1} + S_{2r+2}$; $B_{r+2} = B_{r+1}$; $C_{r+2} = C_{r+1} + S_{2r+3}$; $D_{r+2} = D_{r+1}$.

The part 1, or 3 of Algorithm 1 is called to pre-whitening, or post-whitening, respectively. We call the version of RC6 without both pre-whitening and post-whitening to, simply, RC6W or RC6 without whitening.

We make use of the χ^2 -tests for distinguishing a random sequence from non-random sequence [6, 8, 9]. Let $X = X_0, \dots, X_{n-1}$ be a sequence with $\forall X_i \in$

$\{a_0, \dots, a_{m-1}\}$. Let $N_{a_j}(X)$ be the number of X_i which equals a_j . The χ^2 -statistic of X , $\chi^2(X)$, estimates the difference between X and the uniform distribution as follows: $\chi^2(X) = \frac{m}{n} \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} (N_{a_i}(X) - \frac{n}{m})^2$. Table 1 presents each threshold for 31, 63, 255, 1023 degrees of freedom. For example, (level, χ^2)=(0.95, 44.99) for 31 degrees in Table 1 means that the value of χ^2 -statistic exceeds 44.99 in the probability of 5% if the observation X is uniform. In this paper, we use these four degrees of freedom. For preciseness, we often discuss the χ^2 -statistic for any degree by the level. We set the level to 0.95 in order to distinguish a sequence X from a random sequence.

Table 1. χ^2 -distribution with each degree of freedom

Level	0.50	0.60	0.70	0.80	0.90	0.95	0.99
31 degree of freedom	30.34	32.35	34.60	37.36	41.42	44.99	52.19
63 degree of freedom	62.33	65.20	68.37	72.20	77.75	82.53	92.01
255 degree of freedom	254.33	260.09	266.34	273.79	284.34	293.25	310.46
1023 degree of freedom	1022.33	1033.83	1046.23	1060.86	1081.38	1098.52	1131.16

In our experiments, all plaintexts are generated by using m -sequence[10]. For example, Algorithm 2, 3, or 4 uses 108-, 113- or 128-bit random number generated by m -sequence, respectively. The platforms are IBM RS/6000 SP (PPC 604e/332MHz \times 256) with memory of 32 GB.

3 χ^2 -statistic of RC6

In this section, we investigate how to lead to much stronger biases with less constraint of plaintexts. In [8], if plaintexts (A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0) are chosen in such a way that both $lsb_5(A_0)$ and $lsb_5(C_0)$ are fixed, and that both B_0 and D_0 introduce zero rotation in the 1st round, then the ciphertexts lead much stronger biases. However, such condition is rather strict constraint because the number of plaintexts satisfied with such conditions are reduced to 2^{108} . We investigate other conditions that has almost the same effect with less constraint of plaintexts. To observe this, we conduct the following experiments.

Test 1: χ^2 -test on $lsb_5(A_{r+1}) || lsb_5(C_{r+1})$ in the case which both B_0 and D_0 introduce zero rotation in the 1st round, $lsb_5(A_0) = 0$, and $lsb_5(C_0) = 0$.

Test 2: χ^2 -test on $lsb_5(A_{r+1}) || lsb_5(C_{r+1})$ in the case which both B_0 and D_0 introduce zero rotation in the 1st round, $lsb_5(A_0) = 0, \dots, 31$, and $lsb_5(C_0) = 0$.

Test 3: χ^2 -test on $lsb_n(A_{r+1}) || lsb_n(C_{r+1})$ for $n = 3, 4, 5$ in the case which both $lsb_5(A_0)$ and $lsb_5(C_0)$ are set to 0, and both B_0 and D_0 introduce zero rotation in the 1st round.

Test 4: χ^2 -test on (any consecutive 5 bits of A_{r+1}) $|| lsb_5(C_{r+1})$ in the case which both $lsb_5(A_0)$ and $lsb_5(C_0)$ are set to 0, and both B_0 and D_0 introduce

zero rotation in the 1st round.

The conditions on plaintexts and ciphertexts in Test 1 is the same with that in [8]. Apparently, the conditions on plaintexts or ciphertexts in other tests is eased. We observe whether the almost same effect as Test 1 is expected with the eased conditions or not.

3.1 Test 1 and 2

The ciphertexts lead much stronger biases if plaintexts (A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0) are chosen in such a way that both $lsb_5(A_0)$ and $lsb_5(C_0)$ is 0, and that both B_0 and D_0 introduces zero rotation in the 1st round[8]. Test 1 examines the effect. The implementation results in the case of $r = 4, 6$ are shown in Table 2. We compute the χ^2 -value on $lsb_5(A_{r+1})||lsb_5(C_{r+1})$ on the average of 100 keys, and the level and the variance. Especially, the variance will be discussed in the following sections. In the case of Test 1, the number of available plaintexts is 2^{108} . Next we

Table 2. The χ^2 -value on $lsb_5(A_{r+1})||lsb_5(C_{r+1})$ of RC6 in Test 1(the average of 100 keys, the level and the variance)

4 rounds						
# texts	2^{12}		2^{13}		2^{14}	
The χ^2 -value	Average	Level Variance	Average	Level Variance	Average	Level Variance
	1045.450	0.694 1774.828	1076.568	0.881 2177.806	1126.800	0.987 2448.999
6 rounds						
# texts	2^{28}		2^{29}		2^{30}	
The χ^2 -value	Average	Level Variance	Average	Level Variance	Average	Level Variance
	1041.933	0.667 2098.079	1060.985	0.801 2263.724	1095.914	0.944 2942.704

discuss the difference between Test 1 and 2. In the first round, each of A_1 and C_1 is added to each round key, and thus neither $lsb_5(A_1)$ nor $lsb_5(C_1)$ is zero in the final stage of the first round even if plaintexts are chosen with the condition of Test 1. Therefore, the same effect as $lsb_5(A_0), lsb_5(C_0) = 0$ is expected if only $lsb_5(A_0)$ and $lsb_5(C_0)$ is just fixed. Test 2 examines the hypothesis. The experimental results of Test 2 are presented in Figure 1. In Figure 1, the horizontal line corresponds to the fixed value of $lsb_5(A_0)$ and the vertical line corresponds to the significance level of the χ^2 -value for each number of plaintexts. From Figure 1, we see that any $lsb_5(A_0)$ can be distinguished from a random sequence in almost the same way as $lsb_5(A_0) = 0$. The same discussion also holds in the case of $lsb_5(C_0)$. To sum up, we do not have to set $lsb_5(A_0) = lsb_5(C_0) = 0$ in order to increase the χ^2 -value. We can use plaintexts with any (A_0, C_0) by just classifying it to each $lsb_5(C_0)$ and $lsb_5(A_0)$, and thus the number of available plaintexts is 2^{118} .




Fig. 1. The χ^2 -value for each $lsb_5(A_0)$ of RC6 in Test2 (on the average of 10^4 keys)




Fig. 2. Level of the χ^2 -value in each consecutive 5 bits of $A_5 || lsb_5(C_5)$ of RC6 for each $\#$ texts (on the average of 10^4 keys)

3.2 Test 3

The bias for $lsb_5(A_{r+1}) || lsb_5(C_{r+1})$ of an output after r -rounds are confirmed to be highly nonuniform distribution[8]. In Test 3, we examine whether outputs with other bit-size lead also highly nonuniform distribution or not. Our key recovery algorithm shown in Section 4 and 5 can set the size of recovered key flexibly. Therefore if the nonuniform distribution of $lsb_n(A_{r+1}) || lsb_n(C_{r+1})$ for $n \neq 5$ also holds, then our algorithm can work according to the memory capacity of machine. The experimental results of Test 3 in the case of 4, 6 rounds are presented in Table 3. From the experimental results, we see that the larger n is, the higher the nonuniform distribution of $lsb_n(A_{r+1}) || lsb_n(C_{r+1})$ is, and that the nonuniform distribution of $lsb_n(A_{r+1}) || lsb_n(C_{r+1})$ for $n = 3, 4$ is also observed in the same way as $n = 5$. Since we use the χ^2 -value on $lsb_3(A_{r+1}) || lsb_3(C_{r+1})$ in Section 4, other experimental results in the case of $lsb_3(A_{r+1}) || lsb_3(C_{r+1})$ are shown in Table 4.

3.3 Test 4

In Test 4, we compute the χ^2 -value in (any consecutive 5 bits of $A_{r+1} || lsb_5(C_{r+1})$). Figure 2 shows the experimental results in the case of 4 rounds. The horizontal line corresponds to the first bit of consecutive 5 bits of A_5 , and each plot presents the level of χ^2 -value in the case of each consecutive 5 bits for each number of plaintexts. For example, the case of $i = 1$, or $i = 32$ corresponds to $A_5^{[5,1]}$, or $\{A_5^{32}, A_5^{[4,1]}\}$. From Figure 2, we see that (any consecutive five bits of $A_5 || lsb_5(C_5)$) can be distinguished from a random sequence in almost the same way as $lsb_5(A_5) || lsb_5(C_5)$.

Table 3. The χ^2 -value on $lsb_n(A_{r+1})||lsb_n(C_{r+1})$ of RC6 for each # texts, the average of 100 keys, the level, and the variance

4 rounds									
# texts	2^{12}			2^{13}			2^{14}		
χ^2 -value	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance
$n = 3$	66.275	0.635	140.251	69.518	0.733	155.518	81.111	0.938	244.195
$n = 4$	268.910	0.737	493.753	277.883	0.845	618.303	301.961	0.977	679.494
$n = 5$	1045.450	0.694	1774.828	1076.568	0.881	2177.806	1126.800	0.987	2448.973

6 rounds									
# texts	2^{29}			2^{30}			2^{31}		
χ^2 -value	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance
$n = 3$	71.804	0.791	203.645	76.572	0.883	209.564	88.474	0.981	270.062
$n = 4$	273.571	0.797	580.289	290.854	0.939	699.839	323.876	0.998	1049.104
$n = 5$	1060.985	0.801	2263.680	1095.913	0.944	2942.691	1173.418	0.999	3270.362

Table 4. The χ^2 -value on $lsb_3(A_5)||lsb_3(C_5)$ of RC6 for each # texts, the average of 10^5 keys, the level, and the variance

# texts	2^7			2^8			2^9		
χ^2 -value	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance
	63.174	0.530	126.426	63.241	0.532	126.612	63.395	0.538	126.645

# texts	2^{10}			2^{11}		
χ^2 -value	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance
	63.820	0.553	130.434	64.655	0.581	131.970

3.4 χ^2 -statistic of RC6 without pre-whitening

In this section, we focus attention on RC6 without pre-whitening, and investigate how to lead much stronger biases with less constraint of plaintexts. In Test 2, we see that the χ^2 -value on $lsb_5(A_{r+1})||lsb_5(C_{r+1})$ becomes significantly high if both B_0 and D_0 introduce zero rotation in the 1st round, and both $lsb_5(A_0)$ and $lsb_5(C_0)$ are fixed. That is, in Test 2, both $lsb_5((A_0 \oplus F(B_0 + S_0)) \lll F(D_0 + S_1))$ and $lsb_5((C_0 \oplus F(D_0 + S_1)) \lll F(B_0 + S_0))$ are fixed. Therefore, in the case of RC6 without pre-whitening, the same effect as Test 2 is expected if only both $lsb_5((A_0 \oplus F(B_0)) \lll F(D_0))$ and $lsb_5((C_0 \oplus F(D_0)) \lll F(B_0))$ are fixed. To observe this, we do the next experiments.

Test 5: χ^2 -test on $lsb_5(A_{r+1})||lsb_5(C_{r+1})$ of RC6 without pre-whitening with $lsb_5((C_0 \oplus F(D_0)) \lll F(B_0)) = 0$, and $lsb_5((A_0 \oplus F(B_0)) \lll F(D_0)) = 0$.

Test 6: χ^2 -test on $lsb_5(A_{r+1})||lsb_5(C_{r+1})$ of RC6 without pre-whitening with $lsb_5((C_0 \oplus F(D_0)) \lll F(B_0)) = 0$, and $lsb_5((A_0 \oplus F(B_0)) \lll F(D_0)) = 0, \dots, 31$.

Table 5 shows the result of Test 5 in the case of 4 rounds. Compared with Table 2, we see that almost the same effect as Test 1 is obtained from Test 5. More strictly, the effect of Test 5 is better than that of Test 1. The experimental results of Test

6 is presented in Figure 3. In Figure 3, the horizontal line corresponds to the fixed value of $lsb_5((A_0 \oplus F(B_0)) \lll F(D_0))$ and the vertical line corresponds to the χ^2 -value for each number of plaintexts. From Figure 1, we see that any $lsb_5((A_0 \oplus F(B_0)) \lll F(D_0))$ can be distinguished from a random sequence in almost the same way as $lsb_5((A_0 \oplus F(B_0)) \lll F(D_0)) = 0$. The same discussion also holds in the case of $lsb_5((C_0 \oplus F(D_0)) \lll F(B_0)) = 0$.

More importantly, in the case of analysis of RC6 without pre-whitening, we can handle plaintexts by controlling $lsb_5((A_0 \oplus F(B_0)) \lll F(D_0))$. To sum up, we can use any plaintext to analysis for RC6 without pre-whitening by just classifying it into each $lsb_5((A_0 \oplus F(B_0)) \lll F(D_0))$ and $lsb_5((C_0 \oplus F(D_0)) \lll F(B_0))$, and thus the number of available plaintexts is 2^{128} .

Table 5. The χ^2 -value on $lsb_5(A_5)||lsb_5(C_5)$ of RC6 without pre-whitening in Test 5(the average of 100 keys, the level, and the variance)

# texts	2^{12}			2^{13}			2^{14}		
χ^2 -value	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance
	1054.720	0.761	2653.532	1083.073	0.906	2634.250	1137.702	0.993	2504.252




Fig. 3. The χ^2 -value for each $lsb_5((A_0 \oplus F(B_0)) \lll F(D_0))$ of RC6 without pre-whitening in Test 6 (on the average of 10^4 keys)

3.5 Experimental remarks

We have seen from the experimental results that high correlations between an input and an output of RC6 are observed if both inputs and outputs are chosen appropriately. Correlation attack makes use of the correlation: if we choose a correct key, then high correlations between an input and an output of RC6 would

be observed; but if we choose a false key, then high correlations between an input and an output of RC6 would not be observed. In distinguishing algorithm, the χ^2 -value is computed on the average of keys, and thus only the conditions, of which the average of χ^2 -value is high, are discussed. However, each experimental results show that variance of distribution of the χ^2 -value can not be negligible in the case of correct keys. Generally, for a normally distributed X with the average μ , and the variance σ^2 , the probability that the data exists in $\{\mu - \sigma \leq X \leq \mu + \sigma\}$, $\Pr(\mu - \sigma \leq X \leq \mu + \sigma)$, satisfies

$$\Pr(\mu - \sigma \leq X \leq \mu + \sigma) = 0.68.$$

Therefore, if the variance would not be reduced, then we could not rule out all false keys, and single out exactly a correct key. In the following sections, we will design key recovery algorithms in such a way that the variance of χ^2 -distribution is reduced.

3.6 Estimation

In the following sections, we will show key recovery algorithms, based on χ^2 -test. We actually implement these key recovery algorithms against RC6W with 5 rounds, and evaluate the χ^2 -value necessary for key recovery against RC6W with 5 rounds exactly. For the discussion against RC6W with more rounds, we use the same method as [8] to estimate the complexities of key recovery algorithms: we estimate *slope*, that is, how many plaintexts are required to get similar values in a χ^2 -test on $r + 1$ rounds compared with r rounds.

Our key recovery algorithms are Algorithm 2, 3, and 4. The condition of χ^2 -test of these three key recovery algorithms are classified into two cases: one is the case of both Algorithm 2 and 3; and the other is that of Algorithm 4. We discuss the slope in each case. Note that our algorithms are applied to RC6W, but from the point of view of χ^2 -value, we can make use of χ^2 -test of RC6. As for the post-whitening, the χ^2 -value without post-whitening is the same as that with post-whitening. As for the pre-whitening, the condition without pre-whitening is the same as that of which B_0 and D_0 introduce zero rotation in the 1st round of RC6.

In the case of both Algorithm 2 and 3, the slope of χ^2 -test is estimated by that of the following conditions:

Condition 1 The χ^2 -test on $lsb_3(A_{r+1}) || lsb_3(C_{r+1})$ of RC6 in the case which both B_0 and D_0 introduce zero rotation in the 1st round, $lsb_5(A_0) = 0$, and $lsb_5(C_0) = 0$.

Condition 1 is the same with the case of $n = 3$ in Test 3. The precise experimental results in Condition 1 are shown in Table 6. Table 6 shows the number of plaintexts required for the χ^2 -value with each level, 0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.90, and 0.95, which are calculated to the first decimal place. From Table 6, we can estimate that to get similar values in a χ^2 -test on $r + 1$ rounds compared r rounds requires a factor of $2^{8.1}$ additional plaintexts.

In the case of Algorithm 4, the slope of χ^2 -test is estimated by that of the following conditions:

Condition 2 The χ^2 -test on $lsb_3(A_{r+1})||lsb_3(C_{r+1})$ of RC6 in the case which both B_0 and D_0 introduce zero rotation in the 1st round, $lsb_3(A_0) = 0$, and $lsb_3(C_0) = 0$.

The precise experimental results in Condition 2 are also shown in Table 6. From Table 6, we can estimate that to get similar values in a χ^2 -test on $r + 1$ rounds compared r rounds requires a factor of $2^{8.1}$ additional plaintexts in the same way as Condition 1.

Table 6. $\log_2\#(\text{texts})$ required for the χ^2 -value of RC6 with each level

Level	Condition 1		Condition 2	
	4 rounds	6 rounds	4 rounds	6 rounds
0.70	12.5	28.3	14.9	30.8
0.75	12.9	28.6	15.3	31.1
0.80	13.1	29.2	15.6	31.6
0.90	13.8	30.2	16.1	32.5
0.95	14.2	30.7	16.6	32.8

4 A chosen plaintext correlation algorithm

In this section, we present two chosen-plaintext key recovery algorithms against RC6W, Algorithm 2 and 3.

4.1 Algorithm 2

The conditions on plaintexts in Algorithm 2 are the same with [8], but Algorithm 2 is designed by making use of the results of tests in Section 3 as follows:

1. The χ^2 -statistic are not measured on a fixed part of $A_{r+1}||C_{r+1}$ (**Test 4**);
2. The degree of χ^2 -statistic is flexibly set to 63 in such a way that Algorithm 2 is feasible, that is, compute the χ^2 -statistic on 6 bits of $A_{r+1}||C_{r+1}$ (**Test 3**);
3. The χ^2 -value is computed on $z_a||z_c$, to which $lsb_3(B_{r+1})||lsb_3(D_{r+1})$ is exactly decrypted by 1 round (see Figure 4);
4. The decrypted data, $z_a||z_c$, is classified into 64 cases according to each rotation number of the r -th round, and the χ^2 -value is computed on each classified case.

Algorithm 2 This algorithm recovers both $lsb_2(S_{2r})$ and $lsb_2(S_{2r+1})$ of RC6W. Set $(lsb_3(B_{r+1}), lsb_3(D_{r+1})) = (y_b, y_d)$, $(lsb_2(S_{2r}), lsb_2(S_{2r+1})) = (s_a, s_c)$, and $(lsb_5(F(A_{r+1})), lsb_5(F(C_{r+1}))) = (x_c, x_a)$, where x_a or x_c is the rotation amount on A_r or C_r in the r -th round, respectively.

1. Choose a plaintext (A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0) with

- $(lsb_5(A_0), lsb_5(C_0), lsb_5(F(B_0)), lsb_5(F(D_0))) = (0, 0, 0, 0)$, and encrypt it.
2. For each (s_a, s_c) ($s_a, s_c = 0, 1, 2, 3$), set a 4-bit integer $s = s_a || s_c$, $S_{2r}^3, S_{2r+1}^3 = 0$, and decrypt $y_d || y_b$ with the key $(S_{2r}^3 || s_a, S_{2r+1}^3 || s_c)$ by 1 round. Note that, by using the r -th round rotation amount x_a and x_c , y_d and y_b can be decrypted to z_a and z_c . We also set a 6-bit integer $z = z_a || z_c$.
 3. For each value s , x_a , x_c , and z , we update each array by incrementing $count[s][x_a][x_c][z]$.
 4. For each s , x_a , and x_c , compute $\chi^2[s][x_a][x_c]$.
 5. Compute the average $ave[s]$ of $\{\chi^2[s][x_a][x_c]\}$ for each s , and output s with the highest $ave[s]$ as $lsb_2(S_{2r}) || lsb_2(S_{2r+1})$.




Fig. 4. Outline of Algorithm 2

Algorithm 2 computes the χ^2 -value on z , to which y is decrypted by the final round subkey. Since the χ^2 -value on the decryption z by using each key, $lsb_3(S_{2r}) || lsb_3(S_{2r+1}) = 1 || s_a || 1 || s_c, 1 || s_a || 0 || s_c, 0 || s_a || 1 || s_c, 0 || s_a || 0 || s_c$ are coincident each other[11], we may decrypt y by setting $S_{2r}^3, S_{2r+1}^3 = 0$ temporarily. Algorithm 2 shows the above works as 6-bit examination and 4-bit estimation, but it can work flexibly as $2n$ -bit examination and $2(n-1)$ -bit estimation for $n = 3, 4, 5$ according to the capacity of memory. We can recover other bits of round keys S_{2r} , and S_{2r+1} by repeating Algorithm 2 sequentially. Apparently, the number of available plaintexts is 2^{108} .

Table 7 shows the results for RC6W with 5 rounds: the success probability among 100 trials, the average of χ^2 -value of recovered keys, the level, and the variance. Let us compare the results in Algorithm 2 with Table 4. In Algorithm 2, the χ^2 -value is computed on each group, classified by the rotation number in the final round. Since all plaintexts in our experiments are randomly generated by m -sequences, plaintexts are roughly estimated to be uniformly distributed to each group. Therefore, the χ^2 -test is computed by using $1/2^{10}$ times the number of plaintexts in Table 7. The χ^2 -test of using $2^{20} - 2^{23}$ plaintexts in Algorithm 2

corresponds to that of $2^{10} - 2^{13}$ in the case of $n = 3$ of Test 3. In a sense, Algorithm 2 computes the χ^2 -value for sample mean, which keeps the average of χ^2 -value but reduce the variance of χ^2 -value from statistical fact. Comparing Table 7 with Table 3 and 4, we see that the variance of χ^2 -value in Algorithm 2 is about $1/2^{10}$ as much as that in the corresponding Test3, and that the average of χ^2 -value in Algorithm 2 is almost the same as that in the corresponding Test3. Algorithm 2 can recover a key with rather low level by reducing the variance of χ^2 -value.

More precise experimental results are shown in Table 8. All experiments are calculated to the first decimal place. From Table 8, the number of plaintexts required for recovering a key in r rounds with the success probability of 90%, $\log_2(\#text)$, is estimated,

$$\log_2(\#text) = 8.1r - 19.1,$$

by using the slope computed in Section 3 . By substituting $\log_2(\#text) = 108$, Algorithm 2 can break RC6W with 15 rounds with $2^{102.4}$ plaintexts with a probability of 90%. Algorithm 2 can work faster than an exhaustive key search with 2^{20} memory.

Table 7. Success probability and the χ^2 -value of Algorithm 2 (in 100 trials)

#texts	#keys	χ^2 -value(63 degree)		
		Average	Level	Variance
2^{17}	12	63.106	0.527	0.165
2^{18}	8	63.076	0.526	0.122
2^{19}	16	63.216	0.531	0.109
2^{20}	32	63.492	0.541	0.107
2^{21}	71	64.049	0.561	0.102
2^{22}	99	65.119	0.597	0.133
2^{23}	100	67.321	0.668	0.218

Table 8. $\log_2(\#texts)$ required for recovering a key with the success probability 90%, 70%, and 30% in Algorithm 2(in 100 trials)

	90%	70%	30%
$\log_2(\#text)$	21.4	21.0	20.0

4.2 Algorithm 3

We improve the Algorithm 2 by making use of the results of Test2, that is, ease the conditions on (A_0, C_0) of plaintexts. The conditions on plaintexts in the Algorithm 3 is: both B_0 and D_0 introduce zero rotation in the 1st round; and both $lsb_5(A_0)$ and $lsb_5(C_0)$ are just fixed.

Algorithm 3 This algorithm recovers both $lsb_2(S_{2r})$ and $lsb_2(S_{2r+1})$ of RC6W. Set $(lsb_3(B_{r+1}), lsb_3(D_{r+1})) = (y_b, y_d)$, $(lsb_2(S_{2r}), lsb_2(S_{2r+1})) = (s_a, s_c)$, and $(lsb_5(F(A_{r+1})), lsb_5(F(C_{r+1}))) = (x_c, x_a)$, where x_a or x_c is the rotation amount on A_r or C_r in the r -th round, respectively.

1. Choose a plaintext (A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0) with $(lsb_5(F(B_0)), lsb_5(F(D_0)), lsb_5(C_0)) = (0, 0, 0)$, set $lsb_5(A_0) = t$, and encrypt it.
2. For each (s_a, s_c) ($s_a, s_c = 0, 1, 2, 3$), set a 4-bit integer $s = s_a || s_c$, $S_{2r}^3, S_{2r+1}^3 = 0$, and decrypt $y_d || y_b$ with the key $(S_{2r}^3 || s_a, S_{2r+1}^3 || s_c)$ by 1 round. The decryptions of y_d, y_b are set to z_a, z_c , which are also denoted by a 6-bit integer $z = z_a || z_c$.
3. For each value s, t, x_a, x_c , and z , we update each array by incrementing $count[s][t][x_a][x_c][z]$.
4. For each s, t, x_a, x_c , compute $\chi^2[s][t][x_a][x_c]$.
5. Compute the average $ave[s]$ of $\{\chi^2[s][t][x_a][x_c]\}$ for each s , and output s with the highest $ave[s]$ as $lsb_2(S_{2r}) || lsb_2(S_{2r+1})$.

The number of available plaintexts in Algorithm 3 is 2^{113} . Algorithm 3 uses plaintexts with $lsb_5(C_0) = 0$, but this condition is further eased by classifying the value of $lsb_5(C_0)$. Then the number of available plaintexts becomes 2^{118} .

Table 9 shows the results for RC6W with 5 rounds: the success probability among 100 trials, the average of χ^2 -value of recovered keys, the level, and the variance. Let us compare the results with that of Algorithm 2 in Table 7. In Algorithm 3, the plaintexts computed on the χ^2 -value is further classified to each group by the value of $lsb_5(A_0)$. Since all plaintexts in our experiments are randomly generated by m -sequences, plaintexts are roughly estimated to be uniformly distributed to each group. Therefore, the χ^2 -test of using $2^{22} - 2^{24}$ plaintexts in Algorithm 3 corresponds to that of $2^{17} - 2^{19}$ in Algorithm 2. In the same way, the χ^2 -test of using $2^{22} - 2^{24}$ plaintexts in Algorithm 3 corresponds to that of $2^7 - 2^9$ in the case of $n = 3$ of Test 3. We see the average of χ^2 -value by using $2^{22}, 2^{23}$, or 2^{24} in Table 9 is roughly equal to that by using $2^{17}, 2^{18}$, or 2^{19} in Table 7, and that by using $2^7, 2^8$, or 2^9 in Table 4, respectively. On the other hand, the variance of χ^2 -value by using $2^{22}, 2^{23}$, or 2^{24} in Table 9 is about $1/2^5$ as much as that by using $2^{17}, 2^{18}$, or 2^{19} in Table 7, and about $1/2^{15}$ as much as that by using $2^7, 2^8$, or 2^9 in Table 4, respectively. Algorithm 3 keeps the level of the average of χ^2 -value with less variance of χ^2 -value. As a result, Algorithm 3 can recover a key with more low level by reducing the variance of χ^2 -value than Algorithm 2.

More precise experimental results are shown in Table 10. All experiments are calculated to the first decimal place. From Table 10, the number of plaintexts required for recovering a key in r rounds with the success probability of 90%, $\log_2(\#text)$, is estimated,

$$\log_2(\#text) = 8.1r - 16.6,$$

by using the bias computed in Section 3. By substituting $\log_2(\#text) = 118$, Algorithm 2 can break RC6W with 16 rounds with $2^{113.0}$ plaintexts with a probability of 90%. Algorithm 3 can work faster than an exhaustive key search with 2^{25} memory.

Table 9. Success probability and the χ^2 -value of Algorithm 3 (in 100 trials)

#texts	#keys	χ^2 -value(63 degree)		
		Average	Level	Variance
2^{22}	21	63.067	0.526	0.003
2^{23}	54	63.135	0.528	0.003
2^{24}	93	63.267	0.533	0.005

Table 10. $\log_2(\#\text{texts})$ required for recovering a key with the success probability 90%, 70%, and 30% in Algorithm 3 (in 100 trials)

	90%	70%	30%
$\log_2(\#\text{text})$	23.9	23.3	22.5

5 A known plaintext correlation algorithm

In this section, we present another key recovery algorithm, Algorithm 4, which applies Algorithm 3 in such a way that all plaintexts are available. We have seen that it is very effective for key recovering to compute the χ^2 -value for each appropriate group instead of computing the χ^2 -value flatly for any plaintexts. We introduce the idea to the results of Test 5 and 6 in Section 3. Algorithm 4 classifies any plaintext (A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0) into the same $lsb_3((A_0 \oplus F(B_0)) \lll F(D_0))$ and $lsb_3((C_0 \oplus F(D_0)) \lll F(B_0))$.

Algorithm 4 This algorithm recovers both $lsb_2(S_{2r})$ and $lsb_2(S_{2r+1})$ of RC6W. Set $(lsb_3(B_{r+1}), lsb_3(D_{r+1})) = (y_b, y_d)$, $(lsb_2(S_{2r}), lsb_2(S_{2r+1})) = (s_a, s_c)$, and $(lsb_5(F(A_{r+1})), lsb_5(F(C_{r+1}))) = (x_c, x_a)$, where x_a or x_c is the rotation amount on A_r or C_r in the r -th round, respectively.

1. Given a plaintext (A_0, B_0, C_0, D_0) , set $lsb_3((A_0 \oplus F(B_0)) \lll F(D_0)) = t_a$, $lsb_3((C_0 \oplus F(D_0)) \lll F(B_0)) = t_c$, and encrypt it.
2. For each (s_a, s_c) ($s_a, s_c = 0, 1, 2, 3$), set $s = s_a || s_c$, $S_{2r}^3, S_{2r+1}^3 = 0$, and decrypt $y_d || y_b$ with the key $(S_{2r}^3 || s_a, S_{2r+1}^3 || s_c)$ by 1 round. The decryptions of y_d, y_b are set to z_a, z_c , which are also denoted by $z = z_a || z_c$.
3. For each value s, t_a, t_c, x_a, x_c , and z , we update each array by incrementing $count[s][t_a][t_c][x_a][x_c][z]$.
4. For each s, t_a, t_c, x_a, x_c , compute $\chi^2[s][t_a][t_c][x_a][x_c]$.
5. Compute the average $ave[s]$ of $\{\chi^2[s][t_a][t_c][x_a][x_c]\}$ for each s , and output s with the highest $ave[s]$ as $lsb_2(S_{2r}) || lsb_2(S_{2r+1})$.

The number of available plaintexts in Algorithm 4 is 2^{128} . Algorithm 4 classifies plaintexts by each 3 bit of $(A_0 \oplus F(B_0)) \lll F(D_0)$ and $(C_0 \oplus F(D_0)) \lll F(B_0)$, which may be enlarged to, for example, 5, like the conditions of Test 5 and 6. However, the larger classified bit size is, the larger memory is required.

Table 11 show the results for RC6W with 5 rounds: the success probability among 100 trials, the average of χ^2 -value of recovered keys, the level, and the variance. We see that, in Algorithm 4, the variance of χ^2 -value is much more reduced than Algorithm 2 and 3. As a result, Algorithm 4 can recover a key more efficiently by reducing the variance of χ^2 -value than Algorithm 2 and 3.

More precise experimental results are shown in Table 12. All experiments are calculated to the first decimal place. From Table 12, the number of plaintexts required for recovering a key in r rounds with the success probability of 90%, $\log_2(\#text)$, is estimated,

$$\log_2(\#text) = 8.1r - 13.8,$$

by using the slope computed in Section 3. By substituting $\log_2(\#text) = 128$, Algorithm 4 can break RC6W with 17 rounds by using $2^{123.9}$ plaintexts in a probability of 90%. Algorithm 4 can work faster than an exhaustive key search with 2^{26} memory.

Table 11. Success probability and the χ^2 -value of Algorithm 4 (in 100 trials)

#texts	#keys	χ^2 -value(63 degree)		
		Average	Level	Variance
2^{25}	26	63.057	0.526	0.0003
2^{26}	59	63.108	0.528	0.0005
2^{27}	100	63.230	0.532	0.0007

Table 12. # texts required for recovering a key with the success probability 90%, 70%, and 30% in Algorithm 4(in 100 trials)

	90%	70%	30%
$\log_2(\#text)$	26.7	26.3	25.3

6 A key recovery algorithm against RC6-64

In [13], a two-register version for RC6 is also described, which is oriented to 64-bit architecture. Here we call the two-register version for RC6 to simply RC6-64. In this section, we apply the idea of Algorithm 4 to RC6-64, and discuss the difference between RC6 and RC6-64 from a security point of view.

6.1 A two-register version for RC6

Here we present RC6-64. The round function of RC6-64 is almost the same structure with that of RC6, but it consists of two units (A_i, B_i) . An input of the i -th round is denoted by (A_i, B_i) , and (A_0, B_0) is a plaintexts, where each A_i and B_i is 64 bits. The i -th subkey S_i is also 64 bits. Here the function F is modified to F_6 in a 64-bit-oriented manner,

$$F_6(X) = X(2X + 1) \pmod{2^{64}} \lll 6.$$

Algorithm 5 (Encryption with RC6-64)

1. $A_1 = A_0$; $B_1 = B_0 + S_0$;
2. for $i = 1$ to r do: $t = F_6(B_i)$; $A_i = ((A_i \oplus t) \lll t) + S_i$;
 $A_{i+1} = B_i$; $B_{i+1} = A_i$;
3. $A_{r+2} = A_{r+1} + S_{r+1}$; $B_{r+2} = B_{r+1}$.

The part 1 and 3 of Algorithm 5 is called to pre-whitening and post-whitening, respectively. We call the version of RC6-64 without either pre-whitening or post-whitening to, simply, RC6-64W. As we see in Algorithm 5, RC6-64 is designed by the same concept with RC6. Therefore, we might expect that, especially, the security of round-function is almost the same with that of RC6. However, the security of RC6-64 is rather lower than that of RC6, shown in the next section.

6.2 Key recovery algorithm to RC6-64W

We apply Algorithm 4 in Section 5 to RC6-64W.

Algorithm 6 (Algorithm to RC6-64W) This algorithm recovers $lsb_4(S_r)$ of RC6-64W. Set $lsb_5(B_{r+1}) = y$, $lsb_4(S_r) = s$, and $lsb_6(F_6(A_{r+1})) = x$, where x is the rotation amount on A_r in the r -th round.

1. Given a plaintext (A_0, B_0) , set $lsb_5((A_0 \oplus F_6(B_0)) \lll F_6(B_0)) = t$, and encrypt it.
2. For each s ($s = 0, \dots, 15$), set $S_r^5 = 0$, and decrypt y with the key $S_r^5 || s$ by 1 round. We also set a decryption of y to z , which is a 5-bit integer.
3. For each value s , t , x , and z , we update each array by incrementing $count[s][t][x][z]$.
4. For each s , t , and x , compute $\chi^2[s][t][x]$.
5. Compute the average $ave[s]$ of $\{\chi^2[s][t][x]\}$ for each s , and output s with the highest $ave[s]$ as $lsb_4(S_r)$.

The number of available plaintexts in Algorithm 6 is 2^{128} . Table 13 show the results for RC6-64W with 5 and 7 rounds: the success probability among 100 trials, the average of χ^2 -value of recovered keys, the level, and the variance. More precise experimental results are shown in Table 14. All experiments are calculated to the first decimal place. From Table 14, the number of plaintexts required for recovering a key in r rounds with the success probability of 90%, $\log_2(\#text)$, is estimated,

$$\log_2(\#text) = 5.0r - 8.2.$$

By substituting $\log_2(\#text) = 128$, Algorithm 6 can break RC6-64W with 27 rounds with $2^{126.8}$ plaintexts with a probability of 90%. Algorithm 6 can work faster than an exhaustive key search with 2^{20} memory.

6.3 Further discussion

We discuss the difference between the round function of RC6 and that of RC6-64 from the security point of view. First we conduct the following Test 7 of RC6-64,

Table 13. Success probability and the χ^2 -value of Algorithm 6 to RC6-64W with 5 and 7 rounds(in 100 trials)

5 rounds					7 rounds				
#texts	#keys	χ^2 -value(63 degree)			#texts	#keys	χ^2 -value(63 degree)		
		Average	Level	Variance			Average	Level	Variance
2^{15}	20	31.214	0.545	0.0296	2^{25}	30	31.278	0.548	0.0394
2^{16}	65	31.504	0.559	0.0290	2^{26}	53	31.512	0.559	0.0302
2^{17}	96	32.022	0.584	0.0335	2^{27}	95	32.050	0.586	0.0286

Table 14. $\log_2(\#texts)$ required for recovering a key with the success probability 90%, 70%, and 30% in Algorithm 6 to RC6-64W with 5 and 7 rounds(in 100 trials)

	5 rounds			7 rounds		
	90%	70%	30%	90%	70%	30%
$\log_2(\#text)$	16.8	16.2	15.3	26.9	26.2	25.0

whose results are shown in Table 15.

Test 7: χ^2 -test on $lsb_5(A_{r+1})$ in RC6-64 with r rounds in the case which B_0 introduces the zero rotation in the 1st round, and $lsb_5(A_0) = 0$

Let us compare each round function between RC6-64 and RC6 by using Table 15 and 2. The size of subkeys in RC6-64 is 64 bits. So, the security level of one round in RC6-64, the size of subkeys of one round, is estimated to be equal to that in RC6-32, which has two 32-bit subkeys in one round. Furthermore, the round function of RC6-64 is almost the same structure as that of RC6. However, the slope, defined in Section 3.6, of RC6-64 is apparently lower than that of RC6. This means that the correlations between an input of round function and the output in RC6-64 is kept more than that in RC6. The round function of RC6-64 mixes up data less than that of RC6. We often discuss that the weakpoint of RC5 exists in a data dependent rotation, which is defined by only 5 bits of subkey and data. Although the weakness of data dependent rotation is improved in both RC6 and RC6-64, RC6-64 is much weaker than RC6. The difference between RC6-64 and RC6 exists in the data structure: RC6-64 consists of 2 units, and RC6 consists of 4 units. Both RC6-64 and RC6 make use of modular-additions in order to mix within the unit. Apparently, correlations are introduced by the consecutiveness of modular-additions. From our results, we see that the structure of RC6, 4-unit plaintexts, reduce correlations more efficiently than that of RC6-64, 2-unit plaintexts.

7 Conclusions

In this paper, we have proposed an efficient and feasible known plaintext correlation attack on RC6W. Our attack can break RC6W/ r with a success probability of 90% by using $2^{8.1r-13.8}$ plaintexts. Therefore, our attack can break RC6W with 17 rounds by using $2^{123.9}$ plaintexts. We have also analyzed that the secu-

Table 15. The χ^2 -value on $lsb_5(A_{r+1})$ in Test 7 (the average of 100 keys, the level and the variance)

4 rounds									
# texts	$2^{6.9}$			$2^{8.7}$			$2^{9.5}$		
The χ^2 -value	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance
		34.600	0.700	86.071	40.893	0.890	126.840	51.261	0.988
6 rounds									
# texts	$2^{16.5}$			$2^{17.5}$			$2^{18.9}$		
The χ^2 -value	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance	Average	Level	Variance
		33.966	0.674	73.204	37.666	0.809	112.739	45.193	0.952

urity of the round function of RC6 is enhanced by: not only the data-dependent rotation depends on all bits of the input unit; but also the consecutiveness of modular additions is broken by dividing data into 4 units.

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