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このアイテムの引用には次の識別子を使用してください: http://hdl.handle.net/10119/3872

タイトル: Confrontation Resolution Analysis of Pre-play Mechanism for Increasing Social Welfare
著者: Matsumoto, Takashi
Kijima, Kyoichi
キーワード: pre-play game
confrontation resolution
Prisoner’s Dilemma game
発行日: Nov-2005
出版者: JAIST Press
抄録: The purpose of this paper is to investigate negotiation process among three players facing a non-cooperative game before they actually make final decisions in the framework of confrontation resolution analysis. We call such a negotiation process pre-play game. In this paper first of all, we propose a general framework for describing three-person pre-play game, by defining several types of action of the players. Next, we apply the framework to three-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game with the option of “not playing the game”. Finally, we argue how the social welfare solution (Cooperation, Cooperation, Cooperation) in the game is achieved depending on the types of the players and identify what player type is the strongest against invasion by different types. The findings obtained are not only insightful in an academic sense, but also provide useful suggestions for management of environmental problem practice.
記述: The original publication is available at JAIST Press http://www.jaist.ac.jp/library/jaist-press/index.html
IFSR 2005 : Proceedings of the First World Congress of the International Federation for Systems Research : The New Roles of Systems Sciences For a Knowledge-based Society : Nov. 14-17, 2082, Kobe, Japan
Symposium 2, Session 5 : Creation of Agent-Based Social Systems Sciences Decision Systems
言語: ENG
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/10119/3872
ISBN: 4-903092-02-X
出現コレクション:IFSR 2005

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